Rodney Boomer v. Harry Lewis by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-26-2013 
Rodney Boomer v. Harry Lewis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Rodney Boomer v. Harry Lewis" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 329. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/329 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
No. 13-1246 
___________ 
 
RODNEY BOOMER, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
Sgt. HARRY LEWIS; POLICE OFFICERS JOHN DOE; JOHN DOE, U.S. Federal 
Marshals; JOHN DOE, Doctor & Head RN; DAVID P. CHERUNDOLO, Attorney; 
DONTE, Warden, Lackawanna County Jail; JOHN DOE, Doctor & Physician Assistant, 
Pike County Jail; JANE DOE, Pike County Jail; POCONO MOUNTAIN REGIONAL 
POLICE DEPARTMENT; PRIME CARE; Nurse Administrator PATTI BUNTING;  
LT. CAPOS; RN BILL CHECHO; CHIEF DIRECTOR PRIME CARE; CHIEF OF U.S. 
FEDERAL MARSHALS; CORRECTION OFFICER COLUMBIA; Sgt. DEMARCO; 
Warden JANINE DONATE; DUSM B.J. FLATER; Nurse Administrator BARBRA 
FOX; Correction Officer FORREST FRANCIS; Lt. GATTUSO; DUSM HOLST;  
DUSM JENKINS; ER Dr. JOHN DOE of Mercy Hospital; RN KATHY; Lt. 
KUMBURIS; Chief JOHN P. LAMBERTON; MS. LASTARZA; Warden CRAIG A. 
LOWE; JEFFREY LUTZ; PIKE COUNTY JAIL; CSO POWELL; CHIEF OR 
DIRECTOR PRIME CARE; MICHAEL RICE; MICHAEL E. ROBSON; Assistant 
Warden ROMANCE; Correction Officer SCHWARTZ; DUSM SEWALL; Correctional 
Officer SHAPPERT; DANIEL SMELAS; DR. WILLIAM SPRAGUE; RICHELLO 
STAPLETON; RN SUSIN; Lt. WALSH; Sgt. FRANK YAUORASKI; Dr. ZAGATO 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:06-cv-00850) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert D. Mariani 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 26, 2013 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 26, 2013) 
___________ 
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OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 We write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background of this 
case, so we will discuss the facts only as they are necessary to our analysis.
1
  In short, 
Rodney Boomer sued more than 35 defendants relating to incidents that occurred at the 
time of his arrest, during a hospital visit, and during his imprisonment.  After initial 
motions practice, several groups of defendants remained in the case – the Pocono 
Mountain Regional Police Department (“PMRPD”) defendants;2 the Lackawanna County 
Prison (“LCP”) Medical defendants; LCP Officers; PrimeCare Medical, Inc., and its 
employees (who provided health care services at the Pike County Correctional Facility 
(“PCCF”)); PCCF Nurses; and the other PCCF defendants.  Each group filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  A Magistrate Judge issued a lengthy report and recommendation, to 
which Boomer and some of the defendants objected.  The District Court reviewed the 
matter in a lengthy opinion and granted judgment in favor of most of the defendants.  The 
                                              
1
 A brief summary of Boomer’s claims is as follows:  (1) that he was denied adequate 
medical care for his epilepsy and injuries resulting from epileptic seizures; (2) that he was 
retaliated against for his legal activities; (3) that he was issued fabricated misconduct 
reports and criminal charges; (4) that he was assaulted; (5) that his attorney provided his 
confidential medical records to federal marshals; (6) that he was strapped in a restraint 
chair; (7) that he was forced to do tasks beyond his physical ability; and (8) that he was 
exposed to chemical agents that were sprayed near his cell. 
 
2
 For convenience, we will use the nomenclature used by the District Court for each 
group of defendants.  
    
 3 
District Court denied, in part, the other PCCF defendants’ motion, slating for trial three 
claims relating to an incident that occurred in July 2006 (specifically, an excessive force 
claim against defendants Francis and Schappert, a claim arising from the use of a 
restraining chair brought against defendant Campos, and a retaliation claim against 
defendant Schappert).  The District Court appointed counsel and presided over a jury 
trial.  After the jury rendered its verdict, the District Court entered judgment in favor of 
the defendants, and against Boomer, on the final three claims. 
 Boomer appeals.  He raises a challenge to the District Court’s ruling on the 
summary judgment motions, arguing that the District Court should not have construed 
Local Rule of Court 56.1 Statements of Material Facts as undisputed because Boomer did 
not specifically respond to them.  He explains that he relied on his verified second 
amended complaint and exhibits he submitted to oppose the motions.  Boomer contends 
that a review of his filings will show that the District Court erred in granting the motions 
for summary judgment.
3
  Also, in regards to the jury verdict, he maintains that he should 
have been provided with video surveillance of the July 2006 incident to use at trial and 
objects to, or wishes to counter, testimony provided by witnesses at his trial.     
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Preliminarily, we consider the 
other PCCF defendants’ argument that we should dismiss Boomer’s appeal that relates to 
the jury verdict because he did not provide for a transcript in compliance with Local 
                                              
3
 Although his informal brief is not a model of clarity, we do not agree with the 
defendants who state that Boomer waived all arguments on appeal.  However, we 
conclude that all issues but those we list have been waived, including, as defendant 
 4 
Appellate Rule 11.1.  Although Defendants are correct that failure to comply with the 
transcript rule “constitutes grounds for dismissal of the appeal,” 3d Cir. L.A.R. 11.1, a 
dismissal for a failure to comply with a procedural rule is disfavored.  See Horner Equip. 
Int=l, Inc. v. Seascape Pool Ctr., Inc., 884 F.2d 89, 93 (3d Cir. 1989).  Upon weighing the 
relevant factors, including the willfulness of the rule violation and the prejudice suffered 
by the opposing party,
4
 see id., we decide not to dismiss the appeal or impose sanctions; 
instead, we will consider Boomer’s appeal on the merits. 
As for Boomer’s argument that he should have been provided the video 
surveillance, we first note that Boomer’s efforts to obtain the tapes ultimately resulted in 
the District Court’s ordering the defendants to provide “all surveillance tapes regarding 
the incident of July 7, 2006.”  Order of May 30, 2012 (ECF No. 651).  Although Boomer 
later requested a trial continuance on the basis that he needed further discovery, at that 
point, counsel for the defendants represented that “all existing discovery materials have 
been produced.”  Order of Jan. 8, 2013 (ECF No. 671); see also Letter of Nov. 28, 2012 
(ECF No. 669) (“[I]t has been represented to the Court that Remaining Defendants have 
produced the surveillance tapes .  . . subject to the Order[] issued . . . on May 30, 2012.”)  
                                                                                                                                                  
Maritato asserts, any challenge to the order granting his motion to dismiss.     
     
4
In particular, we note that Boomer did make an attempt to obtain the transcript, ECF 
No. 697, albeit not within 14 days after filing his notice of appeal and without depositing 
the estimated cost or explicitly seeking to have it provided without charge.  No one in the 
District Court ever responded to his request.  Also, we note that the defendants suffered 
minimal prejudice in defending the appeal, as Boomer’s issues are not strictly based on 
the transcript (for instance, his main “trial” claim is a claim about discovery that predated 
the trial).  
 5 
Furthermore, Boomer, himself, stated that at least some of the incident was out of “the 
sight of the housing unit security cameras.”  See, e.g., “Motion requesting new 
appointment of counsel . . . .” at ¶ 6 (ECF No. 245).  For these reasons, we conclude that 
his claim that he was not provided with available videotapes is without merit.   
We also reject Boomer’s other claims related to the trial.  Essentially, he points out 
(albeit without providing the transcript) testimony that he believes is “strange” or false.  
However, it is for the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses.  United States v. 
Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 189 (3d Cir. 2002).  Even if a witness contradicts or alters his or 
her testimony, the testimony still can be sufficient to establish a point.  See id.   
We turn to Boomer’s objections to the grant of summary judgment.  District courts 
must be careful that their application of local rules governing the grant of summary 
judgment remains consistent with the provisions of federal rules and the dictates of the 
Supreme Court.  See Anchorage Assocs. v. V.I. Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 
(3d Cir. 1990).  However, in this case, application of Local Rule of Court 56.1 or no, the 
District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the other defendants 
because there was no genuine issue of material fact remaining for trial.  See Abramson v. 
William Patterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 276 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that our review is 
plenary and that we apply the same standard that the District Court applies); see also Erie 
Telecomms. v. Erie, 853 F.2d 1084, 1089 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that we may affirm on 
an alternative basis supported by the record).      
 6 
We have reviewed the record, including Boomer’s verified complaint and 
exhibits
5
  (and the hundreds of pages that Boomer requested that we consider, see, e.g., 
Informal Brief at 8, even though they were not filed in response to the summary judgment 
motions in question and which the District Court had no obligation to sift through in 
deciding those motions, cf. United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs.”)).  Upon review, and for 
the reasons given in the Magistrate Judge’s report and the District Court’s opinion, we 
agree with the District Court that Boomer did not show more than a disagreement about 
his course of treatment in relation to the LCP Medical defendants.  Such mere 
disagreement, of course, is not an actionable constitutional violation.  See Monmouth 
Cnty. Corr. Inst’l Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987).  
There was no genuine issue of material fact relating to whether Boomer showed an 
actionable constitutional violation against the other LCP defendants, either, for the 
reasons given by the Magistrate Judge and the District Court, at times with reference to 
Boomer’s deposition testimony.  See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) 
(explaining that state-created interests are generally limited to freedom from restraint that 
imposes “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary 
incidents of prison life”); Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(explaining that a non-medical defendant cannot be considered deliberately indifferent for 
failing to respond directly to the medical complaints of a prisoner already under the care 
                                              
5
 We note that the District Court also considered Boomer’s verified complaint and its 
 7 
of a prison doctor); see also, e.g., ECF No. 454-2 at 23 (Boomer dep.) (conceding that he 
was not injured when he was removed from the hospital and stating that the correctional 
officer “was just doing his job”).  
Regarding the PMRPD defendants, we agree with the District Court that summary 
judgment in favor of defendant Lamberton was proper.  See C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 
201 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] defendant in a civil rights case cannot be held responsible for a 
constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor approved.”).  Also, the 
rest of the PMRPD defendants could not be held liable for deliberate indifference to 
serious medical needs where it is undisputed that the defendants promptly called an 
ambulance when Boomer (who has a seizure disorder) had a seizure and where it was 
undisputed that they did not interfere with his treatment by paramedics.  We also agree 
with the District Court’s resolution of the “handcuff claim” based on how it was 
presented in this case.       
We also conclude that summary judgment in favor of PrimeCare Medical, Inc., 
and its employees was proper.  As the District Court noted, Boomer has a medical 
condition for which he needs care and included claims about delays and difficulties in 
receiving treatment.  Some of his claims, like his disagreement with the medical 
judgment about his ability to perform physical tasks, are clearly not bases for suit.  See 
Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst’l Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346.  Similarly, whether or not 
Boomer was hoarding medicine, the requirement that he take his medication in crushed 
                                                                                                                                                  
exhibits.   
 8 
form instead of other forms is a dispute about a treatment decision that is not actionable 
as a constitutional violation in this case.  See id.  What is undisputed is that he received 
medication.  Also, the defendants put forth evidence, which Boomer did not controvert, 
regarding his many visits to outside specialists.  Without repeating the entire analysis but 
while noting the Magistrate Judge’s and District Court’s statements about the need for 
further evidence or an expert’s opinion about the effect of any delays in referrals to 
specialists and the like, we conclude that summary judgment in favor of PrimeCare 
Medical, Inc., and its employees was proper on the record. 
Boomer claimed that the PCCF Nurses were deliberately indifferent to his serious 
medical needs by, inter alia, denying him proper treatment, allowing his move to a 
housing unit far from the medical station, clearing him for physical activities beyond his 
capacity, and crushing his medications.  However, Boomer, himself, in his verified 
complaint, describes medical treatment he received from these defendants.  And the 
defendants provided evidence about the medical attention Boomer received.  Although 
there may be evidence of a dispute between Boomer and defendants as to what treatment 
was appropriate, there is not evidence in the record from which a reasonable trier of fact 
could conclude that the defendants were deliberately indifferent.
6
  Accordingly, and for 
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 Also, as the PCCF Nurses point out in their brief, there is a limit to what treatment they 
are allowed to provide under Pennsylvania’s Professional Nursing Law, 63 P.S. § 211 et 
seq.  See, e.g., 63 P.S. § 212(1) (disallowing “medical diagnosis or prescription of 
medical therapeutic or corrective measures”).   
   
 9 
the reasons given in the District Court, judgment in favor of the PCCF Nurses was 
proper, too.   
The District Court also properly granted judgment in favor of the other PCCF 
defendants on the claims that did not go to trial.  PCCF, itself, to the extent Boomer was 
suing the facility, is not a “person” within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See Will v. 
Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 
(3d Cir. 1973).  Furthermore, as to the claims against the other defendants, the 
defendants, in assigning Boomer a housing unit or a task or in shackling him in an 
ordinary manner, were not obligated to second-guess the medical judgments of those 
whose care Boomer was under.
7
  Cf. Durmer, 991 F.2d at 69.  Also, and for the reasons 
the District Court set forth in greater detail, there is not a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the other deliberate indifference claims in light of the evidence that Boomer got 
medical care, including medications, treatment by prison medical staff, and visits to 
outside specialists.  See, e.g., Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst’l Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346.  
Mere verbal harassment or abuse is not a civil rights violation.   See Oltarzewski v. 
Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987).  The claim against defendant Francis about 
the spitting incident failed in light of Boomer’s guilty plea regarding that incident.  The 
due process claims regarding Boomer’s disciplinary confinement fail for the reasons 
given by the District Court.  Also, although Boomer believes that a chemical agent used 
                                              
7
 We also note that when medical restrictions were imposed on Boomer’s duties, he was 
no longer obligated to perform them.   
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near his cell twice triggered seizures, he did not controvert the defendants’ evidence that 
they did not know that there was a risk of harm to him from using that agent. 
For the reasons we have discussed, as well as those relied on by the District Court, 
we hold that the District Court properly granted the defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment.  Also, as we explained above, Boomer’s claims about the trial and jury verdict 
are without merit.  For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.8             
                                              
8
 The PCCF Nurses, the other PCCF defendants, and defendant Gerard Maritato filed 
motions to supplement the appendix.  We grant their motions.   
